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O objetivo principal desta tese é estudar o impacto que uma maior protecção das 
patentes tem no nível de inovação, utilizando dados transversais para Portugal, Europa 
e Estados Unidos da América. Como medida do nível de inovação foi usado o número 
de pedidos de patentes e para avaliar o nível de proteção do sistema de patentes 
foram usados vários índices de direitos de patentes, como é o caso do Índice de 
Ginarte e Park e o Índice de Direitos de Propriedade Intelectual. Os resultados 







The main objective of this thesis is to study the impact of stronger patent protection 
on the innovation level using cross-sectional data for Portugal, Europe and United 
States of America. To measure the innovation level, this study uses the number of 
patent applications and for the strength of patent protection it uses a combination of 
patent rights index, including Ginarte and Park Index and Intellectual Property Rights 
Index. The results point to a positive effect between the level of patent protection and 
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The study of the relation between innovation and patent protection is far from new. A 
great number of academics spent years delving into this matter, though most of the 
studies presented show an ambiguous relationship between the two. On the one hand, 
it might be argued that there is a positive relationship between innovation and patent 
protection, since companies are motivated by monopoly profits from the patent grant. 
On the other hand, some believe that the existing system issues too much patents, 
many of which are just trivial improvements over prior art, and others as a mean to 
block new firms to enter the market (Hovenkamp and Bohannan, 2010). 
Article 7 of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) talks about this relationship: “The protection and enforcement of intellectual 
property rights should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to 
the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers 
and users of technological knowledge in a manner conducive to social and economic 
welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.” 
When a new invention appears, it is common sense that, if the innovation is any good, 
it should be available to all from a welfare point of view (Arrow, 1962). But if all the 
new inventions became accessible to public free of charge, the firms will not have a 
sufficient incentive to innovate due to the cost of creating and developing a new 
invention being too expensive. 
The origins of patents, in the modern sense, date back to 1474, when the Republic of 
Venice enacted a decree where new and inventive devices had to be communicated to 
obtain the right to prevent others from using them. The Statute of Monopolies (1623) 
and the British Statute of Anne (1710) are seen as the backgrounds of patent and 
copyright law respectively1. However, it was only in the 19th century that the term 
intellectual property started to be used, and not until the late 20th century that it 
became commonplace in the majority of the world. 
                                                             
1 Sullivan, E. Thomas (2000), “The Conference of Antitrust and Intellectual Property at the New 




The five main forms of intellectual property are patents, copyrights, trademarks, mask 
works and trade secrets. Regarding patents, the U.S.A make a distinction between 
patents for invention and patents for design. Also in Europe, there is a similar 
distinction, the design inventions are separated from patents and the organism 
responsible for the design creations is the Office for Harmonization in the International 
Market. Likewise, the new vegetable inventions cannot be patentable, they also have 
their own international organism that protect them. 
 The focus of this paper will be on patents for invention. A patent is a government 
grant of certain rights given to an inventor for a limited time in exchange for the 
disclosure of the invention. This way, patents confer the right to prevent third parties 
from making, using or selling the invention without their owners’ consent. Usually this 
consent is given in return for the payment of a royalty. When a patent is obtained 
through registration, the law grants the patent owner an exclusive monopoly on the 
use and commercial exploitation of the invention for 20 years from the date of first 
filing, in the Portuguese case, as well as in the case of U.S. and the majority of 
countries of the European Union. This 20 years rule only started in 1992 for European 
patents and from 1995 for Portugal and the U.S.A. 
There are three requirements that need to be fulfilled, in order for a patent to be 
granted: novelty (the innovation must be new and not already in the public domain), 
usefulness (it needs to have applicability, practical use, and in the case for Europe, 
must have industrial applicability) and non-obviousness (it is necessary some inventive 
step). Despite these three statutory requirements, two other conditions must be met: 
the disclosure of information – it is necessary that the patent applicant describes all 
the steps of the creation and development of the innovation – and eligibility – in first 
place it is necessary to distinguish what is an invention and what is a mere discovery 
from nature, only the inventions can be patentable. Also there are several areas that 
are not covered by patent protection, as in the case of inventions that go against the 
public health. In the Portuguese case the cases that are not covered by patent 




The protection given by the patents deters potential imitators – who could otherwise 
copy the product, or take advantage of the benefits arising from the innovation. The 
disclosure of information that the patent application requires also helps the diffusion 
of information of new processes and methods, which can help new inventors to 
improve their own innovations, simultaneously reducing “redundant R&D investments 
by firms who might otherwise continue try to develop the same technology.”2 On the 
other hand, the monopoly created by the patent grant may distort competition, which 
can result in inefficient allocation of resources, especially since this is a race – lot of 
independent laboratories invest billions of dollars to create a new invention with the 
objective to obtain patent protection for the invention, but since the rule is “first 
come, first served” (the first company to apply for a patent grant is the one that have 
the exclusive rights of the patent protection), the ones that lose the race waste a lot of 
money and a lot of resources. There is an exception for the U.S.A., the rule there is 
“first to invent, first to file” – they give one year to the creator of the innovation to 
raise sufficient funds to obtain a patent grant. In Europe, although the system was 
created to protect the invention and not the inventor, when the inventor proves that 
he already had been using the innovation before someone else applied for a patent, he 
beneficiates of “pre-use” rights, and he has the exclusivity of the patent.  
This work aims to explain the effect, if there is one, of patent protection in the level of 
innovation by analyzing the existing literature and using some data to understand if 
there is any correlation. Although there are already some studies concerning this 
matter, it remains one of the most controversial questions in the economics of 
technology. Therefore, this paper is divided into five sections. Section 2 is a thorough 
analysis of the existing literature, focusing on some of the most important works. In 
Section 3, I explain the methodology adopted for the study and introduce the collected 
data. More detailed and additional data can be found in the appendices. The results’ 
analysis and the interpretation of the data are in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 presents 
the main conclusions and analyzes some limitations of this study. 
                                                             
2 Andrew J. Nelson, Measuring Knowledge Spillovers: What Patents, Licenses and Publications Reveal 




2. Literature review 
In the economics theoretical literature there are two current views concerning patent 
protection and innovation, one regards the firm’s perspective – it is profitable to 
patent the innovations or not? Are patents the best method for firms to protect the 
profits from their innovations –, and the other one concerns welfare economics’ 
perspective – is the patent system from the welfare point of view, the best method to 
promote innovation and help economic growth?  
With respect to the firm’s perspective the question is should a firm patent or not 
patent? There are several studies concerning this question, some point out that in 
some industries, as pharmaceuticals there is a benefit in patenting the innovations and 
in other industries, as the case of software, the costs associated to the patent process 
do not compensate the benefits. 
The first papers regarding this theory showed that in industries where it is easy to use 
reverse-engineering to discover the process of innovation, as in the pharmaceutical 
industry, the imitation costs increase significantly if compared with any other 
technological field (Mansfield, Schwartz and Wagner, 1981). 
Further on, Mansfield (1986), in a survey done through 1981-1983, showed that 
around 82% of patentable inventions in pharmaceuticals were patented. Later, in a 
study conducted also by Mansfield (1990), it was found that an important number of 
innovations would never have taken place if patent protection didn’t exist (60% in 
pharmaceuticals and 38% in chemicals) – this happens because the investment social 
return’s rate far exceeds the private return.   
However, in some industries, due to the “cumulative” nature of the innovations, 
patent protection can do more harm than good, such as the case of software industry 
and business methods (which are already patentable in the U.S., not the case for 
Europe). Merger and Nelson (1990) link this potential harm to patent breadth, using 
examples from aircraft, radio and pharmaceutical industries to claim for narrow 
patents. Others believe IP protection should only be used for isolated innovations 
because it can create incentive problems with cumulative innovations: in some cases 




destruction3), therefore it is essential to have a trade-off between “achieving static 
efficiency through competition and achieving long-run efficiency through optimal 
investment in research, development, and diffusion of innovation” (Schumpeter, 
1943). In the same line of reasoning, Gallini (1992) showed that when patent awards 
are short, increasing the length of a patent award will raise the profits earned by 
innovators, and therefore increasing the incentive to innovate, but only until a certain 
level, since after that level, increasing patent length will raise the level of imitation by 
rivals. 
Worried about the monopoly power conceded to firms by the patent grant, some 
academics were afraid that the costs associated to the monopoly do not outweigh the 
benefits linked to the information disclosure. Scherer et al. (1992) found that once 
firms have patent protection or compulsory licensing decrees they tend to patent less, 
and use other methods of appropriability, as secrecy, although there is no proof when 
more competition exists in a market, more likely firms will innovate, since the presence 
of competition is not the only motivation for firms to innovate. The possibility of 
appropriating the results of their investment is also a reason to innovate. Hall (2003) 
stated that the patent system is a good incentive scheme to promote innovation when 
“1) considerable funds are needed to develop an invention, as in the case of 
pharmaceuticals, or complex modern information technology, and 2) it is difficult to 
keep the innovation secret, or imitation is easy”.  
In the same line of reasoning, Motta (2004), in his book Competition Policy: Theory 
and Practice, stated that a monopolist would have fewer incentives to innovate than a 
competitive firm, since the monopolist only considers the “additional” profit by the 
new invention, while a competitive firm would consider the whole profit. Furthermore, 
he proved that, in fact, patents improve welfare, as patents remove the negative 
externality created by spillovers, restoring the incentives to invest in R&D. 
Likewise, surveys done on U.S. firms found that a significant number of patentable 
inventions were not patented (Mansfield, 1986) and that secrecy and lead-time 
advantages were viewed as the most important appropriation methods to the 
                                                             




innovator (Cohen et al., 2000; Levin et al., 1987; Arundel, 2001; and Arora et al., 2003). 
Arundel (2000) goes further, saying “there is no reason to strengthen IPRs when other 
appropriation methods provide an adequate incentive to innovate. Doing so would 
simply increase the ability of firms to extract monopoly profits without providing any 
social benefits.” Similar results have been obtained by other academics studying 
European and Japanese firms.  The explanations behind this are the possibility of 
invalidation of the patent when challenged, the disclosure of the innovation method, 
due to the ease to invent around the patent and the high fees charged by the patent 
system. Nevertheless, when the value of the investment in R&D is too high, patents 
proved to be the best method of appropriation of the profits from innovation. 
Moreover, these studies showed that the reason to use the patent system by 
companies is not only to appropriate the profits from their innovation, but also for 
strategic reasons, as for example, to block some new competitors from entering the 
market, and the prevention of lawsuits from other companies. 
Although there are some academics that do not believe in the veracity of these studies 
saying that several of the previous theoretical did not count innovation as a continuous 
process (Maurer and Scotchmer, 2002). And, some are not convinced that these 
results would persist if the focus of the studies were small firms and new entrants 
(Breitwieser and Foster, 2012). In fact, Mazzoleni and Nelson (1998) believe that these 
studies missed some important determinants to explain the relationship between 
innovation and IPR, since small firms and new entrants do not have the same 
mechanisms at their disposal.  
The relationship between patents and innovation, as was showed above, is not so 
linear. Baldwin et al. (2000) says there is a relationship between patent use and 
innovation, but this relationship is not bidirectional: “Firms that innovate take out 
patents, but firms and industries that make more intensive use of patents do not tend 
to produce more innovations.” 
As regards the economics welfare’s perspective, on one hand the disclosure of 
information implied by patents applications helps the diffusion of technical knowledge 




productive process, and therefore generating a race to be the first to patent the 
invention. On the other hand, it creates an inefficient allocation of resources, since 
there are a lot of companies “fighting” for the same patent, when one applies for a 
patent – winning the race – the others lose the investments made in the discover of 
that innovation. Although sometimes, not all the investments are lost in the process, 
for example, in the case of pharmaceuticals, when two or more firms are competing 
for the discovery of a new drug which cures cancer, they can find other drugs that cure 
other diseases in the process. As well, there is the deadweight loss associated to the 
monopoly created by the patent protection, and the costs associated to the patent 
system. 
Hereupon, are the benefits of disclosure information enough to overlap the costs 
associated to the patent system and the deadweight loss and misallocation of 
resources created by it? There are some scholars that believe that the answer to this 
question is yes, and others believe that if there were no patent system, there would be 
no reason to implement one today. 
As a matter of fact, in 1958, Fritz Machlup in a report to the Congress stated, 
If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our 
 present knowledge of its economic consequences, to recommend instituting 
one. But since we have had a patent system for a long time, it would be 
irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge, to recommend abolishing 
it. 
In addition, Barzel (1968) said that intellectual property rights can stimulate too much 
innovation, which can replicate in wasteful duplicative or uncoordinated innovation 
activity, hurting competition. 
Early, academics decided to study if, in fact, stronger patent protection helped or not 
to stimulate innovation and economic growth. But what is the meaning of stronger 
patent protection? Stronger patent protection is sometimes associated with an 
increase in the patent length or breadth. For Nordhaus (1969), the longer the patent 
protection, the higher the innovation, but also the deadweight loss associated to the 
monopoly created by the patent protection. Hence, he argues, it is essential to balance 




to reward innovation is to have infinitely-lived patents and the optimal patent scope is 
the indispensable to cover the investment. In a similar study, Acemoglu and Akcigit 
(2011) show that a decrease in the patent length (from 50 years to 9 years) will reduce 
the rate of innovation (from 1.1% to 0.15%). Kamien and Schwartz (1974) and 
Klemperer (1990) also agree that an increase in patent protection unambiguously 
increases the rate of innovation. However, when patents are already strong, increasing 
the patent length further can, in fact, contract the level of innovation (Horowitz and 
Lai, 1996).   
In an important contribution, Ginarte and Park (1997) constructed an index of patent 
rights for 60 countries between 1960-1990. The results of their study showed no 
relationship between the strength of patent rights and economic growth, with the 
exception being rich countries, where they found a positive relationship between 
stronger patent protection and investment and R&D. 
Later, Kanwar and Evenson (2003) studied, at the aggregate level, the effect of 
stronger IPR protection (measured by Ginarte and Park (1997) index of IPRs) in R&D 
expenditure and they discovered that stronger IPR protection has a positive and a 
significant impact on the share of R&D investment in GDP. Furthermore, Lederman and 
Manoley (2003), Chen and Puttitanum (2005), and Falk (2006) also found a positive 
and significant effect between innovation and patent protection. 
Nevertheless, there are some studies that show that this relation between patent 
protection and innovation is not so linear. On one hand, the costs of information 
disclosure more than offset the private gains from patenting (Horstmann, 1985). Other 
studies show that approximately 50% of all patents lapse due to failure in paying the 
renewal fees through the mid-point of the 20 years, in the case of U.S., and in 
European jurisdictions with annual renewal requirements, approximately 95% of all 
patents lapse due to failure in the payment of renewal fees previous to the end of the 
statutory term4. There are also several studies showing the “worthless” of the patents 
granted (Schankerman and Pakes, 1984; Pakes, 1985).  
                                                             




On the other hand, some studies showed that an increase in patent protection have a 
negative effect on innovation. Sakakibara and Branstetter (1999) and Bessen and 
Maskin (2000) found a negative correlation between the strength of IP system and 
innovation. Their results were not supported in Kortum and Lerner (1998), however. 
Lerner (2002) shows that when a country reinforces its patent system it will increase 
the number of patents registered by foreign inventors; yet, there is no proof of an 
increase in patentability of the domestic inventors, neither in their country itself or in 
the foreign country. Moser (2005) found a similar result in her work: “I find no 
evidence that patent laws increased levels of innovative active but strong evidence 
that patent systems influenced the distribution of innovative activity across 
industries”. 
Moreover, Boldrin and Levine (2009) estimated that the optimal patent term would be 
somewhere between 5 to 10 years. In their example, if a world economy is growing at 
4% a year, then patent protection should be reduced, approximately, 1% per year. In a 
different work, although with similar results, Krasteva (2012) showed that patent 
protection may impede R&D investment even in the context of independent 
innovations. 
Some academics are convinced that intellectual property protection, including patent 
protection, is essential to stimulate innovation. Lemley (2001) stated that the goal of 
patent system is to promote innovation by giving inventors economic rewards. 
However, this relation is ambiguous, since over the years were several studies that 
pointed out a positive relationship between them, and others that do not see the 
positive effects of the patent system, and several asking for a reform of the current 
patent system (Boldrin and Levine, 2013). 
 
3. Methodology and data collection 
In this section I will explain the main reasons for the choice of the data used in this 
thesis, and also I will present the data collected and some data that I used from other 




To study the relationship between patent protection and innovation I decided to focus 
on Portugal (PT), Europe (EUR), and United States of America (USA). The reason for the 
choice of these three economies was simple, Portugal is the country that I am natural 
off, and it was of my special interest compare Portugal with the other two economies 
to understand the importance of the patent system in Portugal. Europe and the U.S.A. 
are the two major case studies, already analyzed by the most important papers, 
concerning this topic, and second, since they were already the focus of many papers, 
there is more data available.  
Some of the data used in this paper were collected in World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) Statistics Data Center and World Bank’s site. I also used data 
presented in Cohen, Nelson and Walsh (2000) relative to surveys made to U.S firms, 
and from Ginarte and Park (1997), Park (2008) and Intellectual Property Rights 2012 
Report to compute the patent rights index, that will be explain further on.  
To measure the rate of innovation I used the number of patent applications, since it 
removes the “vagaries” of patent offices, which can affect the number of patents 
granted, leaving only the creations of the inventors. Although it is not an effective 
measure of innovation, due to the fact that not all patents filed are effectively 
patentable, this measure was already used in many papers, and is the one that gathers 
more consensus. 
The number of patent applications is not the only way to measure innovation. The 
other measures usually used are new products or products improvement - but not all 
products are guarantee to succeed -, the patent citations - however, patents can be 
self-cited-, and inventions disclosure or suggestions – yet, ideas are seldom realized. 
The number of patent applications between 1980-2011 is not uniform between the 
economies in analysis, as we can see in figure 1. In Portugal the number of patent 
applications are decreasing over time (-64.56%). Portugal registered 1823 patent 
applications in 1980 and only 686 in 2011. However, Portugal didn’t always recorded 
this decreasing path, between 1980-1990, Portugal noted an increase in patent 
applications of 95%, with the maximum number of applications of 3642 listed in 1990, 




In Europe, if we look throughout the years in the sample (1980-2011), we observe a 
reduction in the number of patent applications (-23.19%), however after 1990, patent 
fillings at the European Patent Office (EPO) registered an increase of more than 45%. 
In the case of United States of America, the story is different, the number of patents 
applications increased more than 380%, throughout 1980-2011. 
 
 
In figure 2 are showed the number of patent grants for Portugal, Europe and the 
U.S.A.: we observe the same path as patent applications, with a declining path 
recorded by Portugal and Europe, minus 93.68% and minus 39.58%, respectively, and 
once more, US showing more than 263% increase between 1980-2011.  
It is important to mention that I could use the number of patent applications and the 
number of patent grants to compute the percentage of the number of patents 
effectively granted, however that analysis cannot be done since when a patent is filed 
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If we look closer to the origin of  patent applications, as shown in figure 3, it is easy to 
perceive that until 1992, almost all patent applications in Portugal were made by 
foreign innovators. After 1992, we see an increase in domestic patent applications, and 
in 2011, only less than 12% of the patent applications were non resident patents. In 
Europe, the majority of patents applications are done by domestic inventors, with 
38.78% (2002) as the maximum of patent applications registered at (EPO) by foreign 
innovators. In the U.S., the ratio between non resident and resident patent 
applications is very close but from 2009 the percentage of foreign patent applications 
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I also decided to look to the amount of research and development expenditure, since 
the majority of innovations involve a large sum of research and development spending, 
especially in the first stage of the creation of the invention. 
Figure 6 presents the total of the research and development expenditure in 
percentage of GDP per year, throughout 1996-2010. These expenditures for research 
and development are current and capital expenditures (both public and private) on 
creative work undertaken systematically to increase knowledge, including knowledge 
of humanity, culture, and society, and the use of knowledge for new applications. R&D 
covers basic research, applied research, and experimental development. 
Table 1 - Research and Development Expenditure (% of GDP) 
Office 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
EUR 175.87% 178.01% 175.26% 183.71% 180.65% 186.59% 183.48% 186.13% 182.51% 182.15% 184.42% 184.50% 194.20% 203.89% 202.65% 
Portugal 55.62% 57.04% 63.04% 68.66% 72.78% 77.22% 73.20% 71.07% 74.36% 77.86% 98.66% 116.51% 150.31% 164.04% 159.12% 
USA 255.18% 257.63% 259.62% 264.00% 270.86% 271.88% 261.63% 261.28% 254.53% 259.41% 263.57% 270.45% 283.89% 289.66%  N.D. 
Source: United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute for Statistics. 
 
As expected, the United States of America is the country where the expenditure in 
research and development, as percentage of GDP has the higher value, recorded 
almost 300% in 2009. In Europe this ratio is also high, with the spending in R&D hitting 
the 200% in 2009 and 2010. Portugal despite being the one which spends less in 
research and development is the one where this ratio exhibits greater increase (more 
than 180%), between 1996-2010. 
The next three tables present the patent publications by technological field. In Europe, 
in 1980, the field of technology with higher percentage of patent publications was the 
electrical machinery, apparatus and energy, with 20,778 patent published. But, over 
the years this field changed, after 1980, the industries which registered a higher 
number of patent publications were measurement, civil engineering and 
transportation. 
At the INPI the industries that registered the higher number of patent publications 
were pharmaceuticals and organic fine chemistry, and after 1994, civil engineering also 




The United States recorded medical technology as one of the fields with high number 
of patent publications, but also as electrical machinery, apparatus and energy and 
organic fine industry. After 1995, we can add computer technology as one of the 
industries which registered high number of patent publications, recorded almost 


















To comprehend the innovative activity of an economy it is necessary to look also at the 
scientific and engineering articles published and to the high technology exports.  
Table 5 shows the scientific and engineering journal articles published, between 1985-
2009, in the following fields: physics, biology, chemistry, mathematics, clinical 
medicine, biomedical research, engineering and technology, and earth and space 
sciences.  
By looking at table 5 we can see that until 1995, the United States were the economy 
with most articles published in scientific and engineering journals but after 1995, 
Europe started to be the economy with higher number of articles published in 
scientific and engineering journals. 
In all the economies, the number of articles published increased throughout the period 
in analysis; in Europe this increase was almost 100%, in the U.S.A. more than 50% and 
for Portugal this increase was more than 1600%. 
As concerns to the high technology exports, it includes products with high R&D 
intensity, such as in aerospace, computers, pharmaceuticals, scientific instruments, 
and electrical machinery. Data are in current U.S. dollars. 
At table 6 is possible to see that Europe is the economy which exports more high 
technology products, followed by the U.S. and Portugal, throughout the years in 
analysis (1992-2011). These results are perfectly normal given the dimension of these 
three economies. 
In Europe, in 1992, the value of high technology was US$ 174 billion, and during the 
period in question, this value increased significantly, recording at the end of 2011 
more than US$ 623 billion. 
The Portuguese case is different, throughout 1992-2008 we assisted to an increase of 
more than 500%, registering a value of high technology exports of more than US$ 3 
billion. After 2008, this value decreased significantly, and at the end of 2011, the value 




The U.S. also present a decrease in the value of high technology products exports after 
2008. At the end of 1992, the value of high technology exports was US$ 104 billion, in 
2008 the U.S. registered a value for the exports of high technology products of more 


















To do a thorough and more complete analysis of the relation between patent 
protection and innovation, I used data from the surveys presented in Cohen, Nelson 
and Walsh’s (2000) paper. 
In 1994, Wesley Cohen, Richard Nelson and John Walsh (2000) inquired 1478 R&D labs 
in the U.S. manufacturing sector to understand which were the methods used by 
companies to appropriate the profits of their invention. Although the surveys were 
conducted only in the United States, it is my opinion that they are essential to 
understand, in respect to the firm’s perspective, the relationship between innovation 
and patent protection.  
The reason to the choice of these surveys was the fact that they were already used in a 
large amount of academic works and they allow us to comprehend, with respect to the 
firm’s perspective what are the main methods for the firms to appropriate the profits 
of their innovations, and if these methods of appropriation are or not related with the 
firm size and the level of investment in R&D. These surveys also enumerate what are 
the main reasons for companies patent and not patent their innovations. The next 
figures present the main results of the study. More detail data of these surveys can be 
found in the appendices. 
Regarding product innovations, companies considered lead time advantages and 
secrecy as the most effective methods to appropriate the profits of their innovations 
(52.8% and 51%, respectively), as it is showed in figure 4. The most effective 
mechanisms for process innovations considered by firms are secrecy (50.6%) and 








Considering only the large firms, secrecy, lead time advantages and complementary 
manufacturing remain as the most efficient mechanisms of appropriation, as it is 














Mean % of product innovations for which mechanism considered effective
Figure 4 -Effectiveness of appropriability mechanism for product 















Mean % of product innovations for which mechanism considered effective
Figure 5 - Effectiveness of appropriability mechanism for process 
innovations: Mean percentage of product innovations for which 
mechanism considered effective
Source: Source: Cohen, Wesley M., Richard R. Nelson and John P. Walsh (2000), “Protecting their intellectual assets: 
Appropriability conditions and why U.S. manufacturing firms patent (or not)”, NBER Working Papers, National Bureau 
of Economic Research, No. 7552. 
Source: Source: Cohen, Wesley M., Richard R. Nelson and John P. Walsh (2000), “Protecting their intellectual assets: 
Appropriability conditions and why U.S. manufacturing firms patent (or not)”, NBER Working Papers, National 










Companies refer the criteria of novelty in the patent application and the ease to invent 
around, as the most important reasons not to patent. On the other hand, the main 
reasons listed by companies to patent an innovation, either in product innovations as 
in process innovations are to prevent copying, to block potential competitors and to be 












Mean % of product innovations for which mechanisms considered effective 
Figure 6 - Effectiveness of appropriability mechanisms for product 












Mean % of product innovations for which mechanisms considered effective 
Figure 7 - Effectiveness of appropriability mechanisms for process 
innovation for large firm subsample
Source: Source: Cohen, Wesley M., Richard R. Nelson and John P. Walsh (2000), “Protecting their intellectual assets: 
Appropriability conditions and why U.S. manufacturing firms patent (or not)”, NBER Working Papers, National 
Bureau of Economic Research, No. 7552. 
Source: Source: Cohen, Wesley M., Richard R. Nelson and John P. Walsh (2000), “Protecting their intellectual assets: 
Appropriability conditions and why U.S. manufacturing firms patent (or not)”, NBER Working Papers, National 
Bureau of Economic Research, No. 7552. 
Source: Source: Cohen, Wesley M., Richard R. Nelson and John P. Walsh (2000), “Protecting their intellectual assets: 
Appropriability conditions and why U.S. manufacturing firms patent (or not)”, NBER Working Papers, National 
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Figure 9 - Reasons to patent process innovations
Source: Source: Cohen, Wesley M., Richard R. Nelson and John P. Walsh (2000), “Protecting their intellectual assets: 
Appropriability conditions and why U.S. manufacturing firms patent (or not)”, NBER Working Papers, National 
Bureau of Economic Research, No. 7552. 
Source: Source: Cohen, Wesley M., Richard R. Nelson and John P. Walsh (2000), “Protecting their intellectual assets: 
Appropriability conditions and why U.S. manufacturing firms patent (or not)”, NBER Working Papers, National Bureau 







To evaluate the strength of patent protection I used the Ginarte and Park Index (GPI, 
henceforth), an index of patent rights, initially calculated for 110 countries between 
1960-1990, but meanwhile updated to 124 countries and until 2005. This index 
considers five components of the laws: duration of protection, extent of coverage, 
membership in international patent agreements, provisions for loss of protection, and 
enforcement measures. Each of these components was assigned a value of one if 
present and 0 if absent, with the score being the sum of these values as a percentage 
of the maximum value. So, the minimum possible national score was 0 and the 
maximum was 5.  
As this index only includes values until 2005, I used the Intellectual Property Rights 
Index (IPRI, henceforth) to have data until 2010. The IPRI came to replace the GPI, 
however the measurements of the two indices are not the same.  
For this study I only computed the values throughout 1980-2010, since it is our time 
sample analysis. 
As regards the IPRI, it includes three categories: Legal and Political Environment, 
Physical Property Rights and Intellectual Property Rights, but for the purpose of this 











Ease of inventing around
% of repondents by reason 
Figure 10 - For unpatented innovations, reasons to not patent
Source: Source: Cohen, Wesley M., Richard R. Nelson and John P. Walsh (2000), “Protecting their intellectual assets: 
Appropriability conditions and why U.S. manufacturing firms patent (or not)”, NBER Working Papers, National Bureau 




the protection of intellectual property rights, patent protection and copyright policy. 
Unfortunately it does not make any differentiation between them. The overall grading 
scale of the IPRI ranges from 0 to 10, with 10 representing the strongest level of 
property rights protection and 0 reflecting the non-existence of secure property rights 
in a country.  
I decided not to converge the value of IPRI to the scale of the GPI, since these are two 
different measures and cannot be directly comparable. 
Since GPI did not present the average value for Europe, I computed it by calculating 
the arithmetical mean of all European countries listed in Ginarte and Park (1997). 
Table 7 - Patents Rights Index 
Region 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 20105 
Europe 3.12 3.18 3.21 3.87 4.25 4.33 7.46 
Portugal 1.98 1.98 1.98 3.35 4.01 4.38 7.00 
U.S.A. 4.19 4.52 4.52 4.88 4.88 4.88 8.50 
Source: Ginarte and Park (1997) and Park (2008) 
 
4 .  Results’ analysis  
In this section I will analyze in detail the data of the previous section. 
Over the years, patent regimes have gone through important changes, especially in the 
past two decades. The major changes were done in strengthening patent rights, 
mainly, conferring more exclusive rights to patent holders, and expanding the 
coverage and easing enforcement of patent applications. For example, in Portugal until 
1995, the duration of patent protection was only 15 years and in the United States was 
17 years, while the European Convention had already implemented the period of 20 
years to the duration of the patent protection. 
                                                             
5 Data collected from Intellectual Property Rights Index 2012 Report, regards the section of 
Intellectual Property Rights, the data is not divided by intellectual properties categories, therefore 






The United States and Japan were the first to reinforce the duration of patent 
protection in pharmaceutical industry, followed by Europe in 1992. Nowadays, there is 
a supplementary protection certificate that extends the duration of the patent 
protection, in Europe. This certificate only comes into force after the corresponding 
general patent expires. It normally has a maximum lifetime of 5 years, can be extended 
to 5,5 years in cases related to human medical products which data from clinical trials 
conducted in accordance with an agreed Pediatric Investigation Plan have been 
submitted.  
In Portugal, before joining the European Union (EU), patent rights did not have very 
strong protection. For instance, only after joining the EU, Portugal introduced the 
patent for products, before only the processes of the invention were patentable. Also, 
only after the adhesion to the EU, Portugal implemented by decree the possibility to 
“reverse the burden of proof”. This measure was already been discussed in the 
Parliament in 1980 but due to the pressure of the big economic groups did not passed. 
Furthermore, this strengthening of patent protection did not only give higher 
protection to the patent holders, the field covered by patents was also expand, as in 
the case of the United States that, in 1989, took a more liberal approach regarding the 
software industry and business methods, which became patentable for the first time. 
In Europe, software and business methods are still not protected through patent, due 
to the fact that they do not meet the “obviousness” criteria. However, Europe 
continues to strength patent protection, in April 2004 was approved a Directive by the 
European Parliament and the European Council to ease the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights. 
Now, if we look to the data in Section 3 it is possible to see that the number of patent 
applications at the EPO and at the United States Patent and Trade Office (USPTO) is 
increasing between 1990-2011, more than 45% and almost 200%, respectively. 
Although the Portuguese Institute of Industrial Property (INPI) recorded an increase of 
more than 95% in patent fillings between 1980-1990, but after 1991 the number of 
patent applications decreased significantly. This can be explained by the Portuguese 




after 1992 the patent applications in Portugal increased, but they were registered at 
the EPO and not at the INPI. 
As regards the origin of patents applications it is important to notice, that the number 
of domestic patent fillings at the INPI increased substantially, as the number of patent 
applications decreased, from 1992. This supports the theory that, although the 
number of patent applications at the INPI recorded a sudden decrease, this not means 
that the patent applications in Portugal have decreased. The total number of patent 
applications in Portugal increased but after 1992, these applications are filled at the 
EPO and not at the INPI. 
In figure 2 we can notice a slightly increase of non resident patent fillings at the EPO 
and at the USPTO, which may be explained by the desire of foreign patent holders 
increase the extent of their patent application, and also, to protect their market in 
other countries, blocking domestic innovators to use their innovation. 
Relative to the field of patent applications, analyzing the data is possible to see that 
the most chosen field by patent applicants varies across the three economies and in 
the case of Europe and United States of America also differs across time.  
In Europe, throughout 1980-1996, the technological fields that exhibited more 
applications, according to WIPO’s qualification were measurement and civil 
engineering, after 1996 the technological field which registered more patent fillings 
was transportation. 
In Portugal, between 1980-1994, the fields which have registered more patent 
applications were pharmaceuticals and organic fine chemistry. After that period, we 
can see an increase in the patent applications for civil engineering, although 
pharmaceuticals, medical technology and organic fine chemistry also registered a high 
number of fillings. 
In the U.S.A, throughout 1980-2011, medical technology was one of the fields that 
registered the largest number of patent applications, the other two technological fields 
which noticed more fillings were electrical machinery, apparatus and energy and 




technology increased significantly, making it, between 1996-2011, the field with more 
applications.  
To understand better the relation between the number of patent applications and the 
value of the expenditures in R&D, as a percentage of GDP, I used the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) method to construct the regression line describing this relation. Figures 
11, 12 and 13 show the linear regressions for Europe, Portugal and the U.S.A.. 
The results demonstrate that the model does not fit the data, for all the economies 
and this can be explain because this relation is not synchronic. The investment in R&D 
occurs years before the fillings for patent, since the creation and development of a 









































Annual growth rate of patent applications
Figure 11 - Correlation between # patent applications and 






With respect to the scientific and technical journals published there is a positive 
relation between the number of patent applications and the number of articles 
published. Over the years the number of articles published increased exponentially in 
all economies. An explanation for this can be the development of new methods of 
communication and the ease of diffusion of that communication, as for example, 
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Concerning the value of the exports for high technological products, I also decided to 
use the OLS to compute the linear regression between the number of patent 
applications and the exports for high technological products. 
In this case, the results seem to point out to a positive relation between the number of 
patent applications and the high technology exports, with the exception for Portugal. 
This exception can have the same explanation as above, since Portugal joined the EPO, 
in 1992, the number of patent applications at the INPI decrease significantly, due to 
non residents innovators are now using the EPO to register their applications for a 
patent in Portugal. 
But these results are biased. As before, the relation between the number of patent 
applications and the value of exports for high technological products is not synchronic. 
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Figure 14 - Correlation between the number of patent applications and 







Comparing now the data collected from Cohen, Nelson and Walsh’s (2000) with the 
data that I collected from the United States, I found some interesting and matching 
results. 
As was showed in Section 3 both in product innovations as in process innovations the 
most effective methods of appropriation are secrecy, lead time advantage and 
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Figure 15 - Correlation between the number of patent applications and 
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Figure 16 - Correlation between the number of patent applications and 




the best mechanisms to appropriate the profits of innovations, used by companies, 
with 34.8% for product innovations and 23.3% for process innovations.  
Looking to these data by industry, and compare it with our sample for U.S. in 1994, is 
important to highlight that regarding product innovation the industry that highly rated 
patents as an effective mechanism of appropriation was the medical equipment 
industry, followed by drugs (54.70% and 50%, respectively). Now, observing the 
number of patent applications by industry in the U.S. during 1994 it is easy to see that 
the largest number of patent fillings were exactly in medical equipment6. The same 
happens to process innovations, which leads me to conclude that, actually, the most 
effective method to appropriate the profit of an innovation in pharmaceuticals is 
through patenting. 
Although these surveys do not provide data for small firms, analyzing the data for the 
large firm subsample, it seems to support Mazzoleni and Nelson’s (1998) work, which 
assumes that small firms and new entrants have more reasons to patent than the large 
companies, since large firms have other mechanisms to appropriate the return of their 
innovations. Here, it is important to proceed with careful since there are sectors where 
small firms and new entrants cannot compete with the large firms, due to the high 
value of the investments in R&D. 
As regards the reasons for the use of patent protection by companies, these surveys 
also support the majority of the previous literature, as the most important being the 
prevention of copying by other companies, to appropriate some market power by 
blocking some potential competitors and, finally, to prevent some possible suits. 
Therefore, companies do not use patents as a mean of promoting innovation, but 
exactly the opposite, since one of the main reasons to patent is to exclude some 
potential innovators of the market. By blocking potential competitors, patents are 
preventing new entrants to improve previous innovations.  
In contrast, the main reasons why companies decide not to use patent protection for 
their innovations, are the difficulty to fulfill the “novelty” criteria, this happens, 
because a several number of innovations are just improvements of previous 
                                                             




inventions. Other reason is the risk associated to the disclosure of the information – 
when a company applies for a patent it must disclosure information regarding the 
process and the method of the new invention, although, as was already explained, not 
all applications for a patent are conceded with a grant, since they need to pass the 
tests conducted by the patent offices, therefore there is a risk associated to this 
disclosure. Finally, since the companies need to reveal the innovation when filed for a 
patent, the other companies can easily invent around. 
Now, considering the patent rights index presented at table 6, it is possible to observe 
the increase in the strength of patent rights over time, which supports most of the 
previous literature concerning patent protection. 
Comparing them with the number of patent applications, I can observe that there are 
different trends for the different countries. For example, in the case of Europe 
between 1980-1995 we assisted to a reduction in the number of patent fillings, but the 
index of patent rights is increasing through that period, after 1995 we can observe an 
increase of patent applications and also in patent rights index. This increase in the 
patent applications after 1995 can be related with the increase of the patent rights 
index since, the effect of this index is not immediate, the policies taken need time to 
act and to show some results.  
Portugal, indeed, exhibited an increase of almost 100% throughout 1980-1990, and the 
level of patent rights index did not present any variation, although we have seen an 
attempt to increase the level of patent protection in 1980, with the discussion for the 
approval of the “reverse of burden of the proof” in the Portuguese Parliament. In 
addition, after 1990 until 2010 the level of patent applications registered a decrease of 
85% and the patent rights index, on the other hand, raised more than 250%. Yet, we 
cannot forget that this reduction in the number of patent applications is not real, since 
the patent applications in Portugal increased over the years in analysis, but after 1992, 
the majority of applications for patents were filled at the EPO, thus they do not count 
for the INPI data. 
Regarding the U.S., there is a positive correlation between patent rights index and the 




applications more than triples the increase of patent rights index (370% and 103%, 
respectively. 
5. Main conclusions and limitations of the study  
This work supports the majority of theoretical conclusions regarding the relationship 
between stronger patent protection and the level of innovation, presenting a positive 
effect between the two. On one hand, the level of patent protection is increasing over 
the years, this increase not only respects to a higher protection of the patent holders, 
giving them more exclusive rights, but also in the expansion of the coverage of patent 
protection and the ease to enforcement patent applications. On the other hand, the 
number of patent applications follows this increase in the level of patent protection, 
with the exception for Portugal, but this, as was already explained, is due to Portugal 
joined the EPO in 1992, and the majority of the innovations are filed at the EPO and 
not at the INPI. 
Regarding the relation between expenditures in R&D and the number of patent 
application, the model does not fit the data, and here it is important to not forget that 
the investment in R&D by the company is done years before the company applies for a 
patent. This happens because the development of the invention takes time and, 
therefore these two variables are not directly comparable. The same happens to the 
exports for high technological products, although in this case the data seem to fit the 
model. 
As concerns to the fields of patent applications, the data showed some interesting 
results. There are some variations across different industries and across different 
periods of time. For example, in the United States we noted a change in the 
percentage of computers technology’s patent applications across time. But does this 
mean that, between 1980 and 1994, the industry of medical technology was more 
innovative than the computer technology one and that, after 1995, computer 
technology become more innovative than medical technology? The answer to this 
question is not linear. The explanation for this increase in patent applications for 




The data used from Cohen, Nelson and Walsh’s (2000) surveys, allow to demonstrate 
the firms’ perspective, regarding the use of patents for protection of their innovations. 
Patent protection is especially important for small companies and new entrants that 
do not have other means to protect their innovations nor the resources to 
commercialize the innovation; so their only objective is to earn the profits through 
licensing. Although in cases where the investment in R&D is too high, small companies 
and new entrants cannot compete with the larger companies. 
The data also showed that, for large companies, the use of a patent is not always their 
first choice of mechanism to protect the profits of their innovations, but this does not 
mean that they do not use patent protection completely. They can use different 
methods of appropriation in the different stages of the innovation process. For 
example, the companies can use secrecy and lead-time advantages in the first stages 
of the invention, while in the final stages of the development of the innovation, they 
use patent protection, in order to protect it from copy by rivals. 
Certainly, when other methods of appropriation are used, the diffusion of information 
required by the patent application does not exist, which reduces the amount of 
knowledge available to the public. Thus, methods as trade secrets and lead-time 
advantages are not expected to raise the diffusion of technology considerably. 
Nevertheless, these results are not entirely conclusive; there are some significant 
limitations to this study that need to be taken into consideration.  
First, the number of patent applications provides an imperfect measure of innovative 
output, since not all innovations are patented. As we could see above, companies, in 
particularly the larger ones, have other methods to collect the profits of their 
innovations. 
Second, not all patent filed have the approval of the patent offices and are conceded 
with a grant. And not all granted patents last until the patent protection ends, some 
proved to be solely redundant invention, and others are only used to block rivals to 




In addition, the relation between innovation and patent protection is not direct, since 
it takes some years after the policies are implemented for us to see some results in the 
level of innovation.  
Another limitation of this study is that it does not take into account the costs of the 
patent system, not only in the optic of the firms but also in the economy, in general. 
Regarding the firms we need to take into account the risk’s cost of the disclosure of 
the information since there is no guarantee that the innovation will be conceded with 
a patent grant, also for the invention to be protected is necessary that the company 
pays the fees to the patent office. 
As concerns to the costs of the patent system for the economy, it is easy to see that it 
is not cheap to sustain a patent system, for the countries. The costs of implementation 
the patent office, the costs of hire specialists, the analysis and the tests that must be 
done to verify if an innovation can be granted with a patent grant also have a cost, the 
costs of the appeals, just to mention some. Therefore, for less developed countries the 
costs of a patent system can overlap its benefits, but in some cases, these costs are a 
necessary condition to attract foreign investment to the country. 
Further, although this thesis demonstrates a positive relation between stronger patent 
protection and the level of innovation, I cannot prove that without a patent system the 
level of innovation would decrease, since I do not have data for the case of an 
economy with no patent system. 
With respect to the surveys used to demonstrate the firm’s perspective, they were 
only conducted in the United States during a short period of time, therefore they 
possibly do not translate the European reality, especially if we take into account that 
the American patent system is different from the European one, and not directly 
compared. 
Finally, none of the data used in this study was generated by me, but was instead 
collected from third-party sources such as the World Bank, the World Intellectual 
Property Organization and research papers. While this allows the study to refrain from 
any potential bias, it limits the ability to reconstruct any missing data. For example, 




data does not allow to do a ‘fair’ comparison, since the data collected just back from 
1996. Also, the missing data concerning the number of patents in force does not allow 
us to analyze the ratio between the number of patent applications and the number of 
patents that last until the end of the patent protection (20 years). Such an analysis 
would be essential in order to conduct an accurate re-evaluation of the patent system. 
It is also important to interpret these data with caution, since the EPO includes 38 
member states, including countries such as Turkey. 
I further believe it would be important to analyze the different industries in the patent 
system and the duration of the patent protection for each of them, since it is not clear 
that the “one size fits all” principle of the current patent system is the most suitable to 
attain its fundamental goal: the promotion of innovation. Is it reasonable to assume 
that the pharmaceutical industry and the audio-visual technology industry share the 
same characteristics? Or that the industry for medical instruments and the 
semiconductors’ industry are guided by the same purpose? It is hard for me to believe 
so. And I am not only considering the existing differences in the technology and 
economic cycles of each industry. It is also important not to forget that in the case of 
the pharmaceuticals the effective duration of the patent grant is much lesser when 
compared with the other industries, since it is necessary, in addition to the approval of 
the patent office, the approval of the national health authorities. 
Moreover, the other methods of intellectual property protection were missed in this 
study, it would be interesting to do a similar analysis for each of them individually, but 
also for all of them to understand if, this positive effect registered in patents and 
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Appendix IV: Patenting activity by industry (1991-1993) – percent of R&D 
























Appendix VI: Effectiveness of appropriability mechanisms for process 
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